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programs, especially in contrast to the
substantial amount of work scholars
and policy analysts have produced in
recent years on Chinese military modernization and its implications for regional security. Bernard Cole’s Taiwan’s
Security: History and Prospects, which
provides a comprehensive and well
written assessment of recent developments in Taiwan’s defense establishment, represents an important step in
filling this gap.
In this work, Cole—a respected China
scholar who served in the U.S. Navy for
thirty years and is now professor of international history at the National War
College—examines the changes currently under way in Taiwan’s armed
forces and defense bureaucracy. The
main purpose of Cole’s thorough and
well researched study is to assess
changes in Taiwan’s defense posture
and their implications for the island’s
security. After presenting a brief history
of Taiwan’s military and an overview of
the Chinese military threat, Cole explains that Taiwan in recent years has
been unwilling to increase the level of
resources devoted to its own military
capabilities. Although Taiwan is reorganizing its defense bureaucracy and its
military is professional and well trained,
the growing asymmetry in defense
spending between Taiwan and China is
resulting in a rapid erosion of Taiwan’s
long-standing qualitative edge over the
Chinese military. Indeed, Cole argues
quite persuasively that the cross-strait
military balance is tipping toward
China as a result of Taiwan’s relatively
modest response to the growing security
challenge represented by the acceleration of Chinese military modernization.
Consequently, Taiwan cannot defend
itself on its own and may not even be
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able to hold out until the U.S. military
could intervene decisively.
Cole also includes a brief discussion of
the factors underlying Taiwan’s unwillingness to do more to counter China’s
growing military capability. He argues,
first, that many officials in Taiwan believe Chinese military threats lack credibility and, second, that decision
makers in Taipei are convinced that the
United States would come to Taiwan’s
assistance even if they turn out to have
underestimated China’s willingness to
use force. According to Cole, the U.S.
decision to send two aircraft carrier
battle groups to the region during the
1995–96 Taiwan Strait crisis not only
convinced Beijing that attacking Taiwan
would likely result in American military
intervention but also led Taipei to the
same conclusion. Given the assumptions that China lacks the willingness to
use force and that U.S. intervention is
virtually assured in the unlikely event of
a cross-strait conflict, many politicians
in Taiwan conclude that the island does
not really need to invest its own scarce
resources in defense. In all, Taiwan’s
Security makes an important contribution to scholarship and policy analysis
by providing a readable and informative
assessment of a previously understudied aspect of the U.S.-China-Taiwan
relationship.
MICHAEL S. CHASE

Naval War College
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Sea power analysts surveying the “rise” of
China commonly compare this emerging
Asian titan to imperial Germany, whose
unification upset the European greatpower concert ushered in after Waterloo,
and for good reason. Naval enthusiasts
like Kaiser Wilhelm II and Admiral
Alfred von Tirpitz, their imaginations
fired by the works of Alfred Thayer
Mahan, hurled Germany into naval
competition with Great Britain, the
dominant naval power of the day, with
fateful results. References to Mahan are
now routine among Chinese strategic
thinkers. Will China’s Mahanians prod
Beijing onto a similar path to sea
power, and will similar results ensue?
Along comes Sadao Asada, an emeritus
professor at Japan’s Doshisha University. Asada’s masterful book From
Mahan to Pearl Harbor reminds us that
Asian maritime history also offers compelling lessons on how the rise of a new
sea power, in this case imperial Japan,
can disturb a settled nautical equilibrium. In effect, the book is an intellectual history of the Imperial Japanese
Navy (IJN). As the title suggests, the
book traces the influence of Mahanian
theory on Japanese naval thinkers in the
decades after The Influence of Sea Power
upon History appeared in 1890.
Asada attributes the IJN’s use and misuse of Mahan to a combination of factors—bureaucratic rivalry between the
army and the navy, groupthink within
the naval hierarchy, and an abdication
of leadership by senior officials, to
name three. By the onset of World War
II, the navy had convinced itself that
war with the United States was fated
and that Japan could overcome America’s overwhelming material superiority
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by cultivating a warrior ethos in the
ranks. Perversely, IJN leaders disregarded key aspects of Mahanian theory,
in particular the material foundations
of sea power, as they contemplated
Mahanian naval warfare in the Pacific.
From Mahan to Pearl Harbor makes an
ideal companion to David C. Evans and
Mark R. Peattie’s Kaigun, which reviews
the strategies, tactics, and technologies
deployed by the IJN between the service’s inception in Meiji Japan and the
outbreak of World War II. Jon Tetsuro
Sumida’s Inventing Grand Strategy and
Teaching Command, a spirited defense of
Mahan against his detractors, would
make a useful supplement and counterpoint to Asada’s analysis.
Asada’s account is not impervious to
criticism. First, linking deeds with
words and words with thoughts is no
simple matter for historians. His many
references to Japanese officers, say,
“echoing” Mahan or acting out of
“Mahanian navalism” invite critics to
quibble. The author establishes that
many Japanese mariners were reared on
Mahan, but how do we know they were
acting on Mahanian precepts on some
particular occasion if they did not say
so? Second, Mahan was prone less to
“stark racism” than to the clash-ofcivilizations rhetoric that dominated fin
de siècle Americans’ views of Asia.
Still, these are minor faults in an invaluable work. Will China, like imperial
Japan, succumb to Mahanian determinism? How should America respond?
These are questions worth pondering,
and From Mahan to Pearl Harbor makes
a good place to start.
JAMES R. HOLMES

Barrington, Rhode Island
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